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The violence of development:  
Guerrillas, gangs, and goondas in perspective 
 
Gareth A. Jones and Dennis Rodgers
1
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter analyses the intuitively compelling assumption that violence is 
inimical to development. Ever since Marx argued that the development of Europe proceeded 
through “primitive accumulation”, many writers from a wide range of theoretical 
perspectives have in fact regarded development as inherently reliant on coercion and force. 
The chapter provides a brief survey of arguments that violence is linked with development 
before outlining three examples – the cases of guerrillas, gangs and goondas - that, we argue, 
exposes the more productive associations of violence. We accept that not all violence is 
developmental, but the chapter highlights the importance of being able to understand the 
conditions and forms under which violence might or might not be progressive, and how and 
why development becomes linked to violence, and when this relationship potentially 
dissipates.  
 
 
 
“Dangerous human proclivities can be canalized 
into comparatively harmless channels by the 
existence of opportunity for money-making and 
private wealth, which, if they cannot be satisfied in 
this way, may find their outlet in cruelty, the 
reckless pursuit of power and authority, and other 
forms of self-aggrandizement.”  
 
- John Maynard Keynes, The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, 1936: 374) 
 
(1) Introduction: Violence and development 
 
There has been a growing debate during the past decade or so in development studies 
regarding the nature of what is generally referred to as the “security-development nexus” 
(Buur et al., 2007; Duffield, 2007). Although different conceptions of this nexus exist, a 
mainstream consensus seems to have emerged – especially within policy circles – whereby 
‘conflict’ is broadly seen as a phenomenon that is the opposite of ‘development’. This 
particular vision of things was pithily summarised by Collier et al. (2003: 3), when they 
contended that “war retards development, but conversely, development retards war”. 
Certainly, according to data provided by the 2008 Report on the Global Burden of Armed 
Violence, the monetary value of lost productivity due to premature deaths worldwide might 
fall between US$95 and US$163 billion per year (Geneva Declaration, 2008). Moreover, as 
the UN Millennium Project (2005: 183) observed, “of the 34 poor countries farthest from 
reaching the [Millennium Development] Goals, 22 are in or emerging from conflict”, and 
more generally, studies have suggested that so-called ‘failing’ or ‘fragile’ states have the 
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worst record in conventional development terms (Kharas and Rogerson, 2012). From this 
perspective, as the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report on “Conflict, Security, and 
Development” made plain, the need to “accept the links between security and development 
outcomes” would seem obvious (2011: 276; for critiques, see Jones and Rodgers, 2011; 
Watts, 2012). 
As the quote by John Maynard Keynes above highlights, however, such a vision of 
things is by no means new. Keynes was writing in the aftermath of the Great Depression and 
was effectively warning that without the promise of future prosperity then base human 
instincts might threaten violence, authoritarianism and corruption in the future. His 
observation of course proved prescient but it overlooked the fact that “cruelty, the reckless 
pursuit of power and authority, and other forms of self-aggrandizement” constitute a fairly 
accurate précis of the colonialism that was arguably the origin of the exceptional economic 
growth enjoyed by Europe during the latter half of the 19
th
 century and beginning of the 20
th
 
(see Davis, 2001; Rodney, 1972). Certainly, as Karl Marx (1967 [1887]) famously discussed 
in Volume 1 of Capital, there can be little doubt that Empire constituted a major spur for the 
extension of endogenous European capitalism. 
Marx focussed principally on the way the resources from Empire provided the basis 
for factory production in Europe in the form of raw materials, and how this reorganisation of 
production entailed immense “social turmoil” in class relations, but he was very aware that 
the process of capitalist accumulation was far more destructive in the colonies. Writing in the 
pages of the New York Daily Tribune, for example, Marx (1853) noted how the British 
Empire was inducing the near total dismantlement of the economic, social and cultural fabric 
of “Hindostan”. Mike Davis (2001) goes even further, and argues that economic development 
in Europe was in fact actively predicated on the calculated, even deliberate, inducement of 
death through food scarcity leading to mass starvation. He points particularly to three separate 
but interrelated global famines that occurred in 1877–78, 1888–91, and 1896–1902, and left 
between 30 and 60 million people dead in what is now called the ‘Global South’. Davis 
contends that the conventional explanation for these famines, that they were an unfortunate 
consequence of El Niño, ignores the role of colonial rule in converting land from subsistence 
to export crops, removing trees to build railroads, changing irrigation patterns that flooded 
lands, undermining tribal and village institutions, increasing taxation and holding back relief 
programmes that interfered with the “economic laws” of laissez-faire capitalism. 
Numerous critical writers – such as David Harvey (2005), Tania Murray Li (2009), 
and Saskia Sassen (2010), for example – have echoed Marx’s line of analysis, arguing that 
contemporary capitalism effectively constitutes an updated form of “primitive accumulation”. 
In the name of development, Special Economic Zones, mining concessions, agri-business, 
major infrastructure and real estate projects involve the deliberate dispossession of resources, 
especially land, from the poor through state-led combinations of legal measures and coercion 
(Cáceres, 2014; Hsing, 2010; Jones 1998; Levien, 2013). In many ways, as Robert Bates 
(2001: 34) put it more broadly, economic production and capital accumulation have always 
been underpinned by various forms of instrumental violence, to the extent that “coercion and 
force are as much a part of everyday life as markets and economic exchange”. In other words, 
contrary to Keynes’s view that order and peace are achieved through opportunities for money-
making, Bates suggests that order, violence and economic accumulation generally operate 
together and in synch. This is something that obviously has significant implications for 
contemporary development agendas, potentially undermining the current consensus that 
negatively associates violence and development, but also highlighting that development is not 
necessarily a benign process, and generally involves both winners and losers.  
Seen from this perspective, it can be argued that violence is in fact at the centre of 
development processes, and this both implicitly and explicitly. Implicitly, we only have to 
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think of the case that Frantz Fanon (1961) famously made over half a century ago justifying 
anti-colonial violence as a legitimate reaction to imperialism’s brutal production of “the 
Wretched of the Earth”. Although the legitimisation of violence has fallen out of fashion in 
the contemporary period, Fanon’s general line of thinking arguably continues in the form of 
debates about “structural violence” (see Farmer, 1992 & 1996). Explicitly, however, it is 
perhaps in relation to so-called “non-state armed actors” that violence emerges most clearly as 
a major developmental issue. Part of the reason for this is the widespread notion that there has 
been a global decline of state authoritarianism in the past few decades. Whereas states in the 
past were generally the principal institutional vectors for instances of large-scale violence 
such as those associated with colonialism, the end of the Cold War is generally perceived as 
having constituted the culmination not only of a long process of decolonisation but also the 
beginning of a world-wide wave of democratization, and concomitantly a transformation in 
the political economy of violence (Allen, 1999; Kruijt and Koonings, 1999; Westad, 2005). In 
particular, planetary brutality is now understood to stem mainly from non-state sources, such 
as militias, gangs, drug trafficking organisations, or “global ideological struggles” – i.e. 
guerrilla groups and terrorist organisations (World Bank, 2011: 54).  
It is interesting to note that these non-state armed actors are more often than not seen 
as inherently non-development, insofar as they are generally considered to be parochial in 
nature, predicated on a ‘spoils politics’, and concerned with extraction rather than production 
(Hazen, 2013). There is however an established body of literature that considers violent non-
state armed actors in much more productive terms, including for example Charles Tilly’s 
(1985) famous work on “war-making and state-making as organised crime”, where he 
explicitly traces the developmental aspects of non-state armed actors from a historical 
perspective, or Vadim Volkov’s (2002) analysis of “violent entrepreneurs” and the benefits 
that can accrue to patrons and associates in weak state contexts. This chapter inscribes itself 
within this tradition, and explores different articulations of three major forms of contemporary 
non-state violence, namely guerrillas, gangs, and goondas, in order to propose a more 
nuanced conception of the potential relationship between non-state armed actors, violence, 
and development than is currently mainstream within development studies.  
 
(2) Guerrillas 
 
Guerrillas are often considered to be fundamentally ambiguous in nature. Certainly, it 
is common to hear the expression – originally inspired by the work of Walter Laqueur (1977) 
– that “one man’s guerrilla is another’s freedom fighter” used to suggest that the underlying 
dynamics of guerrillas are relative. This implicitly challenges the notion that guerrillas might 
be developmental, insofar as development is generally seen as a normative process, although 
to a certain extent the real issue here is more the fact that “History is written by the victors” – 
to quote another famous expression – and unless guerrillas win, they will inevitably be 
portrayed negatively. Having said this, guerrilla-like phenomena are by no means new. As 
Eric Hobsbawm (1973: 165) has pointed out, comparing guerrillas and social bandits, “every 
peasant society is familiar with the ‘noble’ bandit or Robin Hood who ‘takes from the rich to 
give to the poor’…” – a form of redistribution that is arguably fundamentally developmental 
in nature, albeit rather local in scope. Hobsbwam (1973: 166) however goes on to suggest that 
contemporary guerrillas are fundamentally different. In particular, their  
 
“novelty is political, and it is of two kinds. First, situations are now more 
common when the guerrilla force can rely on mass support… It does so in part 
by appealing to the common interest of the poor against the rich, the oppressed 
against the government; and in part by exploiting nationalism… The second 
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political novelty is the nationalization not only of support for the guerrillas but 
of the guerrilla force itself… The partisan unit is no longer a purely local 
growth; it is a body of permanent and mobile cadres around whom the local 
force is formed.”  
 
Seen from this perspective, modern guerrillas can plausibly be conceived as 
fundamentally developmental in a much broader way. On the one hand, this is simply an 
extension of the general notion that revolutions can be intrinsically developmental, insofar as 
they might free a given population from a situation of oppression or constraint. Even if in 
reality this is all too frequently a rather conditional claim (see Trotsky, 2004 [1936], for the 
original statement on the question), one could argue that this makes revolutions a fundamental 
reflection of Amartya Sen’s (1999) conception of “development as freedom”. On the other 
hand, it is striking how yesterday’s victorious guerrillas often become the drivers and 
beneficiaries of tomorrow’s economic development in many countries. Although this is by no 
means always the case – see Hoffman (2011), Utas (2014) – this certainly occurred in 
Nicaragua, where the FSLN guerrilla came to power in 1979 before then losing elections in 
1990. Although the FSLN was voted back into office in 2006, during its decade and a half out 
of power, its cadre became the nucleus of a newly emergent “national bourgeoisie”, as 
Florence Babb (2004) and Dennis Rodgers (2008, 2011) have highlighted. At the origins of 
this particular development is the fact that the FSLN had not expected to lose the elections in 
1990 and faced a critical dilemma following its defeat. As Sergio Ramírez (1999: 55), FSLN 
vice-president of Nicaragua between 1984 and 1990, described in his memoirs:  
 
“the fact is that Sandinismo could not go into opposition without material 
resources to draw upon, as this would have signified its annihilation. The 
FSLN needed assets, rents, and these could only be taken from the State, 
quickly, before the end of the three month transition period [before formally 
handing power over the victorious opposition]. As a result there was a hurried 
and chaotic transfer of buildings, businesses, farms, and stocks to third persons 
who were to keep them in custody until they could be transferred to the party. 
In the end, however, the FSLN received almost nothing, and many individual 
fortunes were constituted through this process instead.” 
 
This somewhat unedifying episode in the FSLN’s history is known as the ‘piñata’,2 
and effectively created the nucleus of a Sandinista economic group. Media reports have 
identified over 50 businesses directly associated with the FSLN, including financial service 
providers such as Fininsa or Interfin, the Victoria de Julio and Agroinsa sugar refineries, 
INPASA printers, media outlets such as the Canal 4 television station or the ‘Ya!’ radio 
stations, as well as Agri-Corp, the biggest distributor of rice and flour in Nicaragua with a 
US$100 million turnover (Mayorga, 2007: 92-4). During the mid-1990s there furthermore 
emerged an organised ‘Sandinista entrepreneurs bloc’ (‘bloque de empresarios sandinistas’), 
led by the former FSLN commandante and member of the National Directorate Bayardo Arce 
Castaño, who is a major stake-holder in Agri-Corp – run by his brother-in-law, Amílcar Ibarra 
Rojas – and is also associated with the real estate development company Inversiones 
Compostela, run by his wife, Amelia Ibarra de Arce, which has over US$4 million worth of 
investments in Managua. Other members of this group include the prominent Sandinistas 
Dionisio Marenco and Herty Lewites, for example. The group is the financial lifeline of the 
                                                 
2
 A piñata is a decorated papier-mâché figure filled with sweets, which often features at parties in Latin 
America. It is struck with a stick by a blindfolded person until it breaks open and its contents spill out, at which 
point a scramble ensues as people attempt to grab as many treats as possible. 
 5 
FSLN, particularly at election time. In 2000, for instance, it raised almost US$2 million to 
finance Lewites’ campaign to be elected mayor of Managua (see Rodgers, 2011, for further 
details). 
 The obvious question concerning this emergent Sandinista national bourgeoisie was 
whether it has been in any way ‘progressive’, in the pro-nationalist, anti-imperialist Leninist 
sense of the term, that is to say, whether it became the lynchpin for a process of productive 
capital accumulation and national development that has been sorely lacking in a post-
revolutionary Nicaragua that has ‘mal-developed’ along neo-liberal lines favouring 
transnational rather than national interests. The answer is clearly no. Far from seeking reform, 
what Edelberto Torres-Rivas (2007) famously labelled “right-wing Sandinismo” instead 
established an political-economic settlement whereby Nicaraguan elite and FSLN businesses 
derive a low-level of profit from exclusive monopolies over protected sectors of the domestic 
market, disconnected from transnational imperatives. This is a strategy more familiar to 19
th
 
century hacienda-style capitalism than any form of progressive capitalism, and to this extent, 
far from constituting the accession to power of a developmental national bourgeoisie – and 
even less a return to the utopian politics of Nicaragua’s past – the FSLN’s electoral return 
arguably ultimately constituted little more than a wry illustration of Marx’s (2004 [1852]: 3) 
famous aphorism that “great historic facts and personages recur twice… once as tragedy, and 
again as farce”. The greatest irony, however, is that this elite oligarchy is in many ways 
reminiscent of the political-economic settlement established by the Somoza dynastic 
dictatorship that held sway over Nicaragua between 1934 and 1979 – and which gave rise the 
Sandinista guerrilla violence in the first place. Seen from this perspective, it is legitimate to 
wonder if and when a new guerrilla cycle might open up in Nicaragua. 
 
(3) Gangs 
 
Images of urban gangs as the embodiment of a modern-day barbarism are common on 
cinema and television screens, in magazines and on-line games. Gang member are most 
usually presented and perceived either as evil and deranged sociopaths, or as the 
exemplification of an anomic and senseless violence in a world that is increasingly 
characterised by the loss of traditional socio-political reference points. This view is further 
reinforced because gangs are conventionally considered as emerging in spaces that lack the 
tangible signs of development – i.e. in ghettoes, slums, or council estates – and are therefore 
thought to be a response to a lack of accumulation or mechanisms through which to 
(re)distribute societal wealth such as the welfare state, for example. Nevertheless, a number of 
studies have also explored the ways in which gangs can be considered as developmental in 
scope, and as institutional vehicles for economic accumulation. 
Although studies most consistently reflect on the cultural and sociological motives for 
young men to join or form gangs (see e.g. Jensen, 2008), within these narratives is often an 
economic rationale, the desire to survive in harsh conditions or to ‘get out’ by making it big 
(Anderson, 1999; Contreras, 2013; Sánchez-Jankowski, 1991). In most cases, this has 
involved what might be termed “petty capital accumulation”, as most gang activities involves 
small-scale, localized crime and delinquency such as theft and muggings, as well as, 
sometimes, extortion and racketeering (Fleisher, 1995; Rodgers, 2006; Thrasher, 1927), 
although there is a long tradition of studies highlighting how gangs can also facilitate more 
lucrative economic activities such as drug dealing (Bourgois, 1995; Padilla, 1992). Certainly, 
gangs can further and protect economic activities through the use or threat of violence which, 
in economic terms, operates to protect market position and enforce contracts (Beckert and 
Wehinger, 2013). At the same time, however, gangs need to be careful on how and how much 
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violence is deployed so as not to draw attention from police or security agencies or the 
retaliation of local communities (Sánchez Jankowski, 1991; also Anderson, 1999).
3
  
Although gangs are occasionally analysed as proto firms – and the comparator is often 
mafia organisations – there is a fairly large body of literature that shows that the profits of 
crime are usually low and generally very unevenly distributed. As Steven Levitt and Sudhir 
Venkatesh (2000) have highlighted drawing on the latter’s research with a Chicago gang, the 
profits of street-level drugs trade is only just above viable alternative sources of income due 
to the fact that “the problem of crack dealing is [that] …a lot of people are competing for a 
very few prizes [and] …an immutable law of labor [is that] when there are a lot of people 
willing and able to do a job, that job generally doesn’t pay well” (Levitt and Dubner, 2005: 
105). Dealers also have to suffer losses from the protection payments demanded by police and 
‘stick ups’ by other gangs (Contreras, 2013), as well as the fact that the ties between members 
limit opportunities for many to use their involvement in criminal activity to ‘get out’. The 
classic example in this respect is provided by William Foote Whyte (1993 [1943]: 108) in his 
classic analysis of gangs in the ‘Italian Slum’ of 1930s Boston. As Whyte notes, the leader of 
the ‘corner boys’ known as ‘Doc’ is both intelligent and successful at what he does but loyalty 
to the gang and the neighbourhood operates to diminish his social mobility. 
Nevertheless, in different circumstances, gang involvement in the drug trade has been 
shown to generate and distribute benefits for members and the wider community. In his study 
of the dynamics of a drug dealing gang in a poor neighbourhood in Managua, Dennis Rodgers 
(2007: 79) highlights how “drug-fuelled economic development extended far beyond just 
those directly involved in the trafficking, to the extent that from a nucleus of about thirty 30 
individuals up to 40 per cent more households in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández were visibly 
better off than in non-drug-dealing neighbourhoods”. This points to the fact that the 
developmental potential of drug dealing by gangs is less a function of either the activity itself 
or the gang, but more the context within which it occurs. Drug dealing in Nicaragua occurs 
within broader economies that are more impoverished, more segmented, and where the cost of 
living is lower than in the US, which is why drug dealing is both more lucrative and its profits 
are shared beyond a small, exclusive group (see also Zaluar, 2001, for a similar situation in 
Brazil). What this highlights is the fundamentally contingent nature of developmentalism, 
which far from being normative is actually highly relative, and dependent on the broader 
societal political economy. 
The last point to consider then is whether gangs have the interest or capacity to 
radically alter that political economy. In his classic manifesto, The Wretched of the Earth, 
however, Franz Fanon (1990 [1961]: 54) acknowledged that what he called the gangster was 
often “a thief, a scoundrel or a reprobate”, but he also contended that when the gangster’s 
violence was directed against colonial authority, it became imbued with popular legitimacy 
through a process of “automatic” identification, and the gangster as a result “lights the way 
for the people”. As Steffen Jensen and Dennis Rodgers (2008: 233-34) highlight, however, 
“even if gangs can be seen as potentially offering a glimpse of the possibility of emancipatory 
social change, the tragic truth is that in the final analysis their existence [more often than not] 
actively suppresses the perception of such potential transformation”. They instead propose 
that gangs are perhaps better seen as “war machines”, because they “are really not fighting 
‘for’ anything but themselves. Although they can plausibly be said to be fighting ‘against’ 
wider structural circumstances of economic exclusion and racism, most of the time the 
behaviour patterns of gang members are clearly motivated principally by their own interests 
rather than the active promotion of any form of collective good” (2008: 231).  
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(4) Goondas 
 
Our final articulation of non-state violence considers the figure and role of the 
“goonda” or “dada”. In line with Hobsbawn’s social bandit or Fanon’s conception of the 
gangster, goondas have been a long-standing feature of the social imaginary of violence, 
masculinity and politics in South Asia. They are a frequent presence in newspapers, comics, 
movies – such as Company (2002) and Gangs of Wasseypur (2012) – and novels – such as 
Rohinton Mistry’s A Fine Balance (1995). The goonda represents the classic characterisation 
of the criminal underworld, with figures such as Karim Lala, Chhota Rajan, or Dawood 
Ibrahim nationally and internationally famous (Prakash, 2010). Ibrahim, in particular, has 
featured prominently on the FBI’s ‘most wanted’ lists and has been linked to Al-Qaeda and 
the Pakistan’s intelligence services, something that reflects the furthest extreme of a 
categorisation of goonda that ranges from neighbourhood ‘heavy’ to gangster to terrorist. The 
goonda has in fact long had a difficult relationship with political power and the state. During 
British colonial rule, goondas were singled out as the embodiment of elite and middle class 
anxieties, in part for their involvement with the illegal trade in alcohol, gambling and 
prostitution. In this imagination the goonda was cast as the strong “up-countryman”, 
predisposed to violence, and with little respect for authority.  
Actual knowledge of goonda backgrounds, activities and motives, however, were, as 
Sugata Nandi (2010) notes, based on anecdote and accusation, often from merchant 
organisations threatened by their influence. The real fear of the colonial state was the potential 
for goondas to become key figures in political society, a shift that seemed to have been 
achieved before independence. The concern with the political power and networks of the 
goonda in more contemporary context has tended to focus on their relations or complicity 
with the state. In post-Independence India, the notion of a Weberian-style developmental state 
was quickly undermined by the reliance on networks of nepotism, patrimonialism and mutual 
benefit to get things done. Studies showed how everyday politics, corruption and crime were 
mutually constitutive, with the goonda linking politicians and bureaucrats to criminal 
organisations, and vice versa (Berenschot, 2011; Michelutti, 2008). Indeed, although the 
goonda and goondagiri (thuggery) were not the preserve of a single party or faction within 
the state, Rohinton Mistry adopted the popular term “Goonda Raj” to describe the dominance 
and practices of the Gandhi family in 1970s politics (see Tarlo, 2003). The world’s largest 
democracy appeared to be run through corruption and violence to the benefit of political 
elites, union leaders, licit and illicit business interests.  
The role of the goonda to preserve the system within a set of tacit and possibly more 
explicitly agreed upon rules was however a poorly kept secret. In 1993, following the bomb 
blasts in Mumbai, the government succumbed to pressure to investigate the relations between 
leading crime bosses such as Dawood Ibrahim, widely implicated in the bombings, and state 
officials. A 1995 report by committee chaired by the Home secretary, Shri N. N. Vohra, 
confirmed suspicions of a state colonised by criminal groups, and of crime organisations run 
by leading politicians.
4
 It did not however explore how economic, political and civic life 
beneath the level of national institutions relied on the pervasive figure of the goonda. 
Certainly, there is plenty of evidence that goonda “musclepower” is deployed to lean on 
politicians, union bosses and business people in order to enforce deals and remove opposition 
to reforms, the acquisition of resources, or favours (Berenschot, 2011; Levien, 2013; 
Michelutti, 2010), and goondas have attained key roles in major economic sectors such as 
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coal mining, forestry, transport, real estate and construction, the film industry and finance 
(Bharti 1989; Prakash, 2010; Weinstein, 2014). Referring specifically to the North Indian 
state of Jharkhand, Andrew Sanchez (2010: 167) in fact goes so far as to argue that “goondas 
may well play an integral role in the state’s political, industrial and financial infrastructures”. 
This kind of “co-operation” between goondas, the political class, and capital blurs the 
boundaries between state and society, dictates the temporal intensity and spatial unevenness 
of development, and is “indispensable” to mediating limited resources and state capacity 
(Berenschot, 2011: 275; see also Hansen, 1991).  
To this extent, it can be argued that goondas play a fundamentally developmental role. 
This is something that also becomes apparent when considered in light of goonda relations 
with the poor. The goonda can be identified with a clientelism that might, from time to time, 
serve to redistribute resources to the poor or facilitate access to the state. Goondas can also 
mobilise communities to demonstrate or even riot in order to show their loyalty to a politician 
but also to express anger at state inaction. As Ward Berenschot (2012) observes in the context 
of Ahmedabad, goondas thereby offer communities reliable, speedy and cheap access to the 
state (and concomitantly enhancing the reputation of local politicians whom they are 
associated with as ‘getting things done’). Certainly, there is no doubt neighbourhoods with a 
close relation to the goonda can often ensure an uninterrupted supply of services, from water 
services, rubbish collection or the resolution of property disputes, as well as less interference 
from the state’s oversight of informal activities. Such ability to distribute resources feeds the 
popular imaginary of the goondas as hero (Prakash, 2010). Having said this, gaining resources 
for one community might involve the removal of resources from another, and goondas’ 
capacity to exert ‘muscle’ is just as often wielded against their community, for instance in 
working for landlords to evict tenants or determine the allocation of public housing, medical 
services and jobs. In India, these forms of discrimination are most often caste and religion-
based; hence, the goonda’s capacity to protect or to mobilise problematically often requires 
setting Hindus against Muslims, or vice versa, for example (Berenschot, 2012; Sen, 2007).  
The power of the goondas derives from the poverty of their surroundings, and their 
ability to open out political and economic opportunities is often related to a wider context of 
ethnic politics. But it is not just this, as Thomas Blom Hansen (1991) intimates when he 
describes what he calls the “dada-ization” of the Shiv Sena, the Marathi political party in 
Maharashtra. He points to the fact that its leadership changed from politicians with a business 
background to individuals of more popular origins who also had more criminal connections 
and a greater enthusiasm for violence. Hansen for example traces the rise of Anand Dighe in 
Thane, a suburb of Mumbai, and his use of populist “street politics”, takeover of festivals and 
public ritual, and recruitment of young sainiks (cadets), some of whom would be visibly 
armed at events. For Dighe, violence supported a masculinist image as a “saint-warrior” and 
confirmation of his criminal connections, and therefore established his leadership.
5
 As Hansen 
(1991: 120, 231-2) argues, the style of Shiv Sena brought forth a “Hobbesian theatre of 
power” that combined spectacle, sectarianism and violence in “pure politics”. 
 
(5) Conclusion 
 
Understanding the political economy of contemporary development demands that we 
consider the role of violence and the actions of non-state armed actors in a more nuanced 
manner than is generally the case. Rather than simply seeing these solely as sources of 
destruction and impoverishment, we also need to consider the conditions under which they 
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 At the same time, Shiv Sena also cultivated support among women, some of whom were prominent in 
demonstrations and violence against Muslims, gaining a sense of empowerment, freedom to move in public 
space and respect as “gangsters” (Sen, 2007). 
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can be linked to development processes, even if often in an uncertain manner. In this chapter 
we have focussed on just three types of organisations that have violence as central to their 
modus operandi: guerrillas, gangs, and goondas, and explored how these could be considered 
developmental from the perspective of capital accumulation or political governance. We 
could have considered many others: vigilantes, drug trafficking organisations, pirates, youth 
brigades, to name but a few. We could also have considered violence from a different 
perspective, the meanings and affect of violence, its organisation and coherence, and its 
relation with peace, the importance of demography, youth and gender, to law and human 
rights, and its prevalence, distinctiveness and purpose over time and across space, between 
public and private spheres or neighbourhood and nation-state. Current debates, perhaps best 
encapsulated by the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, have however focused 
on the negative relationship between violence and development, and this whether from an 
economic or political perspective. These tend to be overly simplistic and moralistic in their 
approach, and tend to ignore how many non-state armed actors are deeply involved in 
developmental processes around the world, and have been for a long time. 
Our exposition of guerrillas, gangs, and goondas highlights a number of important 
correctives to the prevailing wisdom that violence is the opposite of, or a hindrance to, 
development in all its forms. While we acknowledge that violence is often destructive and 
anti-developmental, if the primary measure of development is simply taken as capital 
accumulation – as it all too often is – the examples highlight how being, or being closely 
related with, a violent non-state actor provides opportunities for income-generation or wealth 
acquisition. In some cases, gangs for example, the developmental benefits are hard to 
establish. Success will depend on access to activities such as the trade in drugs, smuggling or 
protection, and the consistency of returns can be undone by changing motives or tactics of law 
enforcement and community reaction. If the empirical case is tenuous, however, ethnographic 
evidence shows strongly that a belief in the development potential of gang involvement is 
often a leading motive. Part of the attraction is that these actors emerge from or are embedded 
in local social and political formations, and compared with the state can be regarded as 
reliable and predictable in an uncertain world. People are fully aware that a warlord, gangster, 
or strong man is not a normative social agent, but they often act – or promise to do so – in 
predictable ways. This is often in sharp contrast to the actions of the state which, at least from 
the viewpoint of the community of support, appears to act in an arbitrary fashion and without 
reference to the best interests of the area.  
Our analysis also shows that what are often referred to as ‘non-state’ armed actors do 
not operate consistently against the state but more usually at its margins. Gangs rarely operate 
as a deliberate challenge to the state but they often exploit opportunities to operate as parallel 
or alternative sources of political and economic power in circumstances where the state has 
limited presence or more usually limited legitimacy. Goondas, on the other hand, act in 
defiance of state norms but are central to the state, as the Vohra report outlined. They 
simultaneously serve to limit the legitimacy of state institutions and work in the service of 
state actors. Although guerrilla insurgencies generally do operate against the state, once they 
have achieved their aims of overthrowing an authoritarian regime, guerrillas generally then 
work with the state, often with the specific intention to recalibrate state-citizens relations and 
a country’s political and economic terms of development. Subsequently, however, this 
developmentalism can become more parochial, as the Nicaraguan Sandinistas illustrate well, 
having used political power to extract resources from and through the state, in part as a 
manoeuvre in preparation for a period in political opposition but in some cases for more 
avaricious self-serving motives.  
Nicaragua is by no means unique in this respect, of course – one only has to think of 
Angola, Indonesia, Mozambique, South Africa, or Vietnam, among many others, for example 
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– and starkly highlights an important question to consider in relation to the connection 
between violence and development, which concerns its primary institutional vehicle. There is 
a long-standing theoretical and empirical tradition, from Hobbes to Tilly, that has argued for a 
historical understanding of state formation as being predicated on violence and coercion, and 
when seen from the perspective of gangs, goondas, or guerrillas, little seems to have changed 
in to the twenty-first century. Although the latter are generally perceived in a very negative 
manner, and more often than not receive the greatest proportion of blame for instances of 
global violence – along with terrorists and extremists – ultimately if contemporary 
development – including especially capital accumulation – remains a violent and exclusionary 
process, this is perhaps less the fault of non-state actors such as gangs, goondas, or guerrillas, 
but rather of states, who institutionally embody the particular relationship between violence 
and development.  
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